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NEW YORK CITY'S RESTRICTIVE ZONING




In the last ten years, the "adult entertainment industry" has
mushroomed in New York City.' In response, as part of his "Qual-
ity of Life Campaign,"2 Mayor Rudolph Giuliani proposed a con-
troversial zoning amendment3 to restrictively zone non-obscene
adult entertainment throughout the five boroughs of New York
City.4 After nearly a year of revisions, on September 18, 1995, the
City Planning Commission approved a joint proposal by Mayor Gi-
uliani and the City Council.5 On October 26, 1995, the City Coun-
cil approved Council Resolution No. 1322 (the City's Adult Zoning
Resolution).6
Proponents of the City's Adult Zoning Resolution contend that
pornography attracts rowdy patrons to residential neighborhoods.
Those patrons disturb the nighttime tranquillity; use buildings,
curbs, and sidewalks as urinals; and break beer bottles along the
* J.D. Candidate, 1996; B.A., 1992, Fordham University.
1. "Adult" businesses include video and bookstores, motels, massage parlors, sex
clubs, topless and bottomless or nude bars, and peepshows. New York City Depart-
ment of City Planning, Adult Entertainment Study 1 (1994) [hereinafter DCP Study].
2. Howard Goldman & Rachel D. Tanur, Zoning for Adult Use: A Delicate Bal-
ance; New York City Proposes Tough Zoning Restrictions, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 14, 1994, at
S1.
3. The Mayor also imposed a moratorium - effective November 1994 - that
prohibited the expansion or establishment of any adult businesses for one year from
the date of enactment. Steven Lee Myers, Guiliani Proposes Toughening Laws on X-
Rated Shops, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, § 1, at 1; Goldman & Tanur, supra note 2.
4. Id See infra notes 34-45 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
definition of obscene, unprotected speech.
5. City Planning Commission Adopts Zoning Restricting Adult Entertainment Es-
tablishments, CITY PLANNING NEWS, Sept. 18, 1995; Jonathan P. Hicks, Planning
Commission Approves Limits on Sex Businesses by Slim Margin, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1995, at 3.
6. Vivian S. Toy, Panel Votes Zoning Rule On Sex Shop, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
1995, at B4 (reporting that on October 25, 1995 the City Council's Land Use Commit-
tee approved the City's Adult Zoning Resolution, and that the full council would vote
later that day); Vivian S. Toy, Council Approves Package Of Curbs On Sex Businesses,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1995, at Al (reporting on full Council's subsequent approval of
the City's Adult Zoning Resolution).
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street. 7 Crime rates often rise and property values decrease in ar-
eas immediately surrounding sex shops, most notably where there
is a concentration of such businesses. 8 These are among the most
severe secondary effects that contribute to urban blight.
Zoning the location of adult businesses9 has ignited a hotly
charged debate. Adult business proprietors and many First
Amendment advocates are pitted against New Yorkers who want
pornography and its negative secondary effects out of their
neighborhood. 10
While the majority of the public debate surrounding the City's
Adult Zoning Resolution centers on social policy discussion," this
Note explores in detail the Resolution's legal consequences. In par-
ticular, this Note analyzes whether the City's Adult Zoning Reso-
lution will survive constitutional challenges in light of the most
recent United States Supreme Court and New York State Court of
Appeals decisions pertaining to laws that affect protected First
Amendment expression.
Part I explores the adult pornography industry in New York City
and the constitutional framework developed by both federal and
New York State courts to regulate non-obscene pornographic ex-
pression. Part II analyzes the City's Adult Zoning Resolution in
light of decisions of the New York State Court of Appeals, the
United States Supreme Court, and various federal district and cir-
cuit courts. Part III proposes changes that will increase the
probability that the City's Adult Zoning Resolution will survive
constitutional challenges. This Note concludes that although the
current version of the City's Adult Zoning Resolution infringes un-
7. Rudy Puts a Squeeze on Sleaze, NEWSDAY, Sept. 18, 1994, at A41.
8. DCP Study, supra note 1, at vii.
9. This Note uses "adult business" interchangeably with "adult establishment."
10. See, e.g., Neighborhood Report: Caffeine and Crackdowns: Dispatches from
'94, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 1, 1995, § 13 at 5; Nick Ravo, Zoning Out Sex Oriented Busi-
nesses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1994, § 10 at 1.
11. See infra note 176 for discussion of the social policy impact of the zoning pro-
posal. For instance, the last amendment to the City's Adult Zoning Resolution before
it was passed was allegedly in response to pressure from the outlying boroughs whose
residents argued that "the original proposals would lead many of Manhattan's sex
businesses to migrate en masse to industrial and waterfront areas in Brooklyn and
Queens." Jonathan P. Hicks, Sex Shops Zoning Plan Eases Rules in Manhattan, N.Y.
TiMEs, Sept. 13, 1995, at B1. Shortly after passage of the City's Adult Zoning Resolu-
tion, the Commission on Civil Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York submitted written testimony [the New York City Bar's Testimony] to the City
Council Land Use Committee regarding the constitutionality of the then-Proposal to
Zone Adult Businesses. The Testimony recommended against passage of the then-
proposed zoning rules because they did not meet constitutional mandates.
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constitutionally on adult business owners' First Amendment
speech, a few changes will cure the infirmity.
I. Background
A. New York City's Adult Entertainment Industry
In its Adult Entertainment Study, the Department of City Plan-
ning (DCP) examined New York City's adult entertainment indus-
try.12 In the last decade, the number of adult video stores and
topless bars has grown tremendously. 3 Between 1991 and 1993,
nationwide sales and rentals of adult videos rose seventy-five per-
cent to $2.1 billion. 4 This rise in revenue is a direct result of an
increase in the production of inexpensive triple-X video cassettes
and a corresponding decrease in the number of adult movie
theaters.15
Topless entertainment represents another thriving portion of the
adult industry.' 6 It tends to cater to a young and affluent clientele,
and grosses approximately $50 million a year in New York City
alone.' 7 In a two-year period, the number of "ritzy," upscale top-
less clubs in New York has expanded from five in 1990 to more
than thirty in 1992.18
In 1965, there were only nine adult entertainment establishments
in New York City because of heavy restrictions on the sale of por-
nography.' 9 By 1976, after the City lifted the restrictions, the
12. See supra note 1.
13. DCP Study, supra note 1, at 21. The total number of adult bookstores, peep
shows, and video stores increased from 29 to 86 between 1984 and 1993; topless/nude
bars increased from 54 to 68; and adult video establishments increased from none in
1984 to 64 in 1993.
14. Id. at 16-17 (citing THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 11, 1994, at Al). If sales
from newsstands, general video stores and other outlets not considered "adult en-
tertainment establishments" by the DCP are included, the revenue total increases by
hundreds of millions of dollars.
15. Id. at 17, 21. Shooting on video tape versus film, shorter filming periods,
shorter scripts, cheaper sets, and drastically lower production budgets, including per-
former's salaries, have all contributed extensively to the production of inexpensive
products. The total number of adult movie and live theaters decreased in New York
between 1984 and 1993 from 48 to 23 establishments. Id. See Ravo, supra note 10, at
Al (William H. Daly, director of Mayor's Office of Midtown Enforcement, says the
number of adult video stores in mid-Manhattan alone increased from zero to 20 in
five years and the cost per tape is as little as $3.99).
16. DCP Study, supra note 1, at 18.
17. Id. Approximately 1,500 dancers are employed by topless establishments
throughout the City.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 20.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
number of adult businesses flared to 151.20 By 1993 the number of
adult establishments reached an estimated 177.21 Between the
years 1984 and 1993, Manhattan and Queens experienced the
greatest increase in adult businesses; both were up forty-seven
percent.22
The DCP estimates that at the current rate of increase, by the
year 2002, the number of bookstores, peep shows, and stores sell-
ing adult videos will increase by 197 percent, to approximately 250;
in addition, topless/nude bars will increase from sixty-eight to
eighty-six.23 If adult establishments cause the secondary effects
that lead to urban blight, as many claim, the current statistics and
projected trends indicate an urgent need to regulate the prolifera-
tion of adult businesses in New York City. Such regulation, how-
ever, must pass constitutional muster.
B. Provisions of the City's Adult Zoning Resolution
The City's Adult Zoning Resolution restricts the location of
adult establishments24 throughout the five boroughs of New York
City. Further, the City's Adult Zoning Resolution restricts adult
establishments to manufacturing districts, except those manufac-
turing districts in which residences, joint living-work quarters for
artists or loft dwellings are permitted, 25 and bans adult businesses
from all but a few commercial districts.26
20. Id.
21. DCP Study, supra note 1, at 20. Note that the 1993 estimate is at least
outdated by one year and in anticipation of the one-year moratorium, many new es-
tablishments sprung up throughout the five boroughs. See infra note 54 and accompa-
nying text.
22. DCP Study, supra note 1, at 21. Adult businesses increased from 73 to 107 in
Manhattan and from 30 to 44 in Queens. The Bronx, Brooklyn and Staten Island have
less than 10% of adult establishments in the City, while Manhattan has 80%, and
Queens 11%, of the total. Id. at 21.
23. Id. The number of adult movie and live theaters will decrease from 23 to 11
because of the production of inexpensive video cassettes.
24. Reso. No. 1322, 12-10. "An 'adult establishment' is a 'commercial establish-
ment' where a 'substantial portion' of the establishment includes an adult bookstore,
adult eating or drinking establishment, adult theater, or other adult commercial estab-
lishment, or any combination thereof" as defined further in the City's Adult Zoning
Resolution.
25. Reso. No. 1322, 42-01(a).
26. Reso. No. 1322, 32-01(a) provides that adult establishments shall not be lo-
cated in C1, C2, C3, C4, CS, C6-1, C6-2 or C6-3 zoning districts. In general, these
districts are reserved for the following purposes:
Cl zones accomodate retail and personal service shops needed in residential neigh-
borhoods. T 'pical uses include grocery stores, small dry cleaning establishments, res-
taurants, and barbershops and cater to the daily needs of the immediate
190
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Within those manufacturing districts and commercial districts
where adult establishments are permitted, "adult establishments
shall be located at least 500 feet from a church, a school, a resi-
dence district," and each adult establishment must be located at
least 500 feet from another adult establishment (the separation
provision).27 Moreover, no more than one adult establishment
shall be located on a zoning lot, and the floor area and cellar space
of each establishment cannot exceed 10,000 square feet.28
neighborhhood. New York City Department of City Planning, Zoning Handbook. A
Guide to New York City's Zoning Resolution 76 (1990).
C2 zones permit a wider range of local retail and service establishments than Cl
districts, including, among others funeral homes, small lumber stores, and business
and trade schools; these zones are intended to serve a wider neighborhood. Id. at 78.
C3 zones permit waterfront recreation and uses related to boating and fishing, in-
cluding marinas, boat repair shops and public or private beaches. Id. at 80.
C4 zones are major commercial centers located outside of the central business dis-
tricts allowing department stores, theaters and other commercial uses that serve a
larger area. Id. at 82.
C5 zones are restricted central commercial districts intended for retail uses serving
the metropolitan region and areas with continuous retail frontage such as the retail
area of Fifth Avenue, and with residential space above office or commercial floors.
Id. at 84.
C6 zones are for a wide range of high bulk commercial uses requiring a central
location. Id. at 86.
C6-1, C6-2, C6-3 are defined as general commercial districts outside a central com-
mercial district and are distinguished by different allowable floor area ratios (FAR).
Id. at 86-87.
27. This Note refers to these provisions collectively as the "separation provision."
Reso. No. 1322, 32-01(b) and (c), Special Provisions for Adult Establishments, [in
Commercial Districts,] and 42-01(b) and (c), Special Provisions for Adult Establish-
ments, [in Manufacturing Districts,] provide in pertinent part: (b) "adult establish-
ments shall be located at least 500 feet from a church, a school, a residence district, a
C1, C2, C3, C4, C5-1, C6-1, C6-2, or C6-3 district, or a manufacturing district other
than M1-6M in which new residences, new joint living-work quarters for artists or new
loft dwellings are allowed, under the provisions of the Zoning Resolution, as-of-right
or by special permit or authorization. However, on or after the effective date of this
amendment, an adult establishment that otherwise complies with the provision of this
paragraph shall not be rendered non-conforming if a church or a school is established
on or after April 10, 1995 within 500 feet of such adult establishment." (c) "adult
establishments shall be located at least 500 feet from another adult establishment."
28. Reso. No. 1322,32-01(d), (e) and (f) and 42-01(d), (e) and (f), provide in perti-
nent part:
(d) "no more than one adult establishment permitted under this Section shall be lo-
cated on a zoning lot."
(e)"adult establishments shall not exceed in total 10,000 square feet of floor area and
cellar space not used for enclosed storage or mechanical equipment."
(f)"adult establishments which existed on the effective date of this amendment and
conform to all provisions of the Zoning Resolution relating to adult establishments
other than the provisions . . . of Section 52-77 (Termination of Adult
Establishments)."
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The City's Adult Zoning Resolution also regulates the surface
area and illumination of adult establishments' signs in both the
manufacturing and commercial districts.29 For example, in com-
mercial zones, each adult business sign cannot be larger than 150
square feet and only fifty square feet can be illuminated. 30 No por-
tion of the sign can be flashing.31
C. The Constitutionally Acceptable Framework
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech .... "32 The national debate over the regulation of por-
nography centers on these ten words and the degree of protection
these words afford to non-obscene pornographic expression. The
protection of the First Amendment, however, is only a minimum,
and states may choose to supplement and expand protection under
their state constitutions.33
1. Obscenity: Speech that Receives No Constitutional Protection
Regulation of "sex shops" requires an understanding of the con-
stitutional distinction between obscenity and non-obscene pornog-
raphy. More than thirty years ago, Justice Stewart acknowledged
the difficulty of separating protected speech from unprotected ob-
29. Reso. No. 1322, 32-69 Additional Accessory Business Sign Regulations for
Adult Establishments [in] C6-4, C6-5, C6-6, C6-7, C6-8, C6-9, C7, C8 provide in perti-
nent part:
Accessory business signs for adult establishments are permitted only as set
forth in this Section, and are limited to locations in the districts indicated.
[Tjhe maximum surface area of all accessory business signs for adult estab-
lishments shall not exceed, in the aggregate, three times the street frontage
of the zoning lot, but in no event more than 150 square feet per establish-
ment, of which no more than 50 square feet may be illuminated non-flashing
signs.
Reso. No. 1322, 42-55 Additional Accessory Business Sign Regulations for Adult
Establishments [in] M1, M2, M3 provide in pertinent part:
[T]he maximum surface area of all accessory business signs for adult es-
tablishments shall not exceed, in the aggregate, three times the street front-
age of the zoning lot, but in no event more than 150 square feet per
establishment, of which no more than 50 square feet may be illuminated and
no portion thereof may be flashing... No accessory business signs for adult
establishments shall be permitted on the roof of any building, nor shall such
signs extend above curb level at a height greater than 25 feet.
30. Reso. No. 1322, 32-69; 42-55.
31. Reso. No. 1322, 32-69; 42-55.
32. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
33. See, e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (1986); People v. P.J.
Video, Inc., 501 N.E. 556 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
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scenity in stating, "I know it when I see it."' This statement re-
flects the continuing struggle of the Supreme Court to develop
significant distinctions between expression that is obscene and that
which is protected sexually explicit expression.35
In 1973, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Miller v.
California,36 developed the modem legal obscenity test. Whether
or not a work is obscene depends on:
(a) whether the average person, 'applying contemporary com-
munity standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest... ;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.38
The Court has used the Miller test to deny First Amendment
protection only to the most sexually explicit and hard-core pornog-
raphy.39 Lesser degrees of pornography have consistently merited
34. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
35. See Gianni P. Servodidio, The Devaluation of Non-Obscene Eroticism as a
Form of Expression Protected by the First Amendment, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1231 (1993).
The author discusses the difficulty the Supreme Court has in distinguishing between
material that is obscene and not deserving of First Amendment protection and that
pornography which deserves some degree of protection.
36. 413 U.S. 15, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
37. Id at 24. In Miller, the Court found obscene brochures used in a mass mailing
venture to sell adult books were not constitutionally protected by the First Amend-
ment. Defendants sent the brochures to persons who did not request the material,
and the defendant was convicted of violating a statute prohibiting the conscious distri-
bution of obscene material.
38. Id (citations omitted). The Miller test replaced the test for obscenity in Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), in which the Court stated that obscenity was
sexual material "utterly without redeeming social importance." Id. at 484. The refer-
ence to "community standards" in Miller was adopted from Roth, and proves a source
of controversy over what the Court meant exactly by "community standards" that
generally differ from place to place. Martin Karo & Marcia McBrian, The Lessons of
Miller and Hudnut: On Proposing a Pornography Ordinance that Passes Constitutional
Muster, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 179, 182-90 (1989) (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (sug-
gesting statewide standards may be the best solution)).
39. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159-60 (1974) (finding that the Court
should actively review the content of materials juries labeled "obscene" to limit juries'
discretion in applying the "patently offensive" portion of the Miller test). See also
United States v. Guglielmi, 819 F.2d 451, 454-55 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1019 (1988); Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 771-81 (1977); Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974). Many feminist thinkers adamantly oppose pornography, la-
beling it as a factor contributing to violence against women. Feminist thinkers criticize
the Miller test and the definition of pornography in the 1986 Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography because both standards fail to consider the negative im-
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constitutional protection. For example, in American Booksellers
Association v. Hudnut4 0 the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit's refusal to uphold regulation of pornogra-
phy based upon its alleged negative impact on women.41 In fact,
courts regard such regulations as unconstitutional content-based
attempts to regulate speech protected by the First Amendment.42
In Hudnut, the Court essentially affirmed that the rights of the
pornographer to print film are greater than the rights of women to
feel secure, so long as the product passes the narrow obscenity test
of Miller. 3
Although pornography cannot be regulated solely on account of
its internal qualities and negative impact upon women, the
Supreme Court has approved regulations of pornographic expres-
sion based upon the non-speech-related harmful secondary effects
it has on the surrounding community. 4 Consequently, legislatures
in many states, including New York, have passed zoning reg-
pact of pornography on women. See Patricia G. Barnes, A Pragmatic Compromise in
the Pornography Debate, 1 TEMi. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 117, 121 (1992) (citations
omitted) (exploring feminist philosophy and concern of impact of pornography on
women - relating specifically to the position of women in society and the increase of
violence against women, and taking issue with the Court's focus on morality rather
than harm to women).
40. 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). The Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision without
opinion.
41. The Seventh Circuit admitted that indeed pornography may harm women but
indicated that this effect was one of pornography as speech and therefore cannot be
constitutionally regulated on this basis, declaring that as Americans it is "our absolute
right to propagate opinions that the government finds wrong or even hateful." 771
F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985). The anti-pornography ordinance was drafted by two
well-known radical feminists, Andrea Dworkin and Catharine A. MacKinnon, claim-
ing that pornography leads to sexual inequality and silences the voices of women in
the realm of First Amendment speech. Rene L. Todd, Book Note, reviewing Donald
A. Downs, The New Politics of Pornography, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1811 (1990). See, e.g.,
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y. REv. 321 (1984);
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1 (1985) (providing examples of the radical feminist theory behind the Hud-
nut ordinance).
42. See, Hudnut, e.g., 771 F.2d at 325. See SUSAN M. EASTON, THE PROBLEM OF
PORNOGRAPHY: REGULATION AND THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH (1994), for a thor-
ough examination of the impact of pornography on women and of the obstacles cre-
ated by the definition of obscenity.
43. See Karo & McBrian, supra note 38, at 1990-93.
44. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, reh'g denied, 429 U.S.
873 (1976); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986).
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ulations focusing on the secondary effects of adult-oriented
businesses.45
2. Zoning and the First Amendment: How Government Uses
Police Powers to Restrict Protected Speech
New York City was the first municipality to enact a comprehen-
sive zoning scheme, and within ten years approximately 425 other
local governments followed the example.46 In 1926, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.4 7 held
that so long as freedom of speech is not threatened, a zoning plan
is a valid exercise of local police power if the plan serves a rational
interest of the municipality.48 A few years after Euclid, the Court
explained further that the rationality test gives substantial defer-
ence to legislatures, that should not be second-guessed in close
cases.49 Through a series of subsequent decisions, the Court rein-
forced the notion that local governments have wide latitude in pro-
tecting moral and general quality-of-life concerns of their
communities.5
When a zoning regulation threatens freedom of speech, however,
courts cannot apply this deferential standard. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that government regulation of speech on the
basis of its content is subject to strict judicial scrutiny.51 Therefore,
45. See, e.g., infra notes 99, 111-17 and accompanying text for discussion of ordi-
nances that survived constitutional challenges.
46. New York passed its ordinance in 1916, and within ten years approximately
425 municipalIties enacted similar regulations. Stephen I. Brody, When First Amend-
ment Principles and Local Zoning Regulations Collide, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 671, 681
(1992) (citing ROBERT H. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LAND-USE REGULATION 8 (1977); S. MAKIELSKI, JR.,
THE POLITICS OF ZONING 1 (1966); 1 E.C. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACrICE 9
(1978)).
47. 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). See also Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325
(1927) (deference given to legislature where validity of zoning ordinance is fairly
debatable).
48. Id at 389-90. For a comprehensive discussion of local zoning regulations and
the way in which local knowledge gives "insight into how the law constructs and im-
pedes certain preferences about justice and how law is continually reconstructed as it
is applied to actual situations" see Lea S. VanderVelde, Local Knowledge, Legal
Knowledge, and Zoning Law, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1057 (1990).
49. Zahn, 274 U.S. at 327-28.
50. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (Zoning is permissible for promotion
of safety, health, morals, and the general quality of life in the community.); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (finding small town with mostly one-family
homes near a large, state university campus, had a legitimate government interest in
not permitting more than two unrelated persons to live in one house).
51. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 458-59 (1980) (holding Illinois statute un-
constitutional because it made the impermissible distinction between labor picketing
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ordinances that regulate protected expression will be upheld only if
they are content-neutral.5 2 An ordinance is content-neutral when
it meets the following three criteria: first, the government must
have a substantial interest in the regulation that is unrelated to the
suppression of ideas;53 second, the means of regulating the pro-
tected expression must be narrowly tailored;5 4 and third, reason-
able alternative avenues of communication must be left open for
dissemination of the regulated speech.5
The Supreme Court introduced the first "substantial governmen-
tal interest" prong in United States v. O'Brien,6 where the Court
affirmed David O'Brien's conviction for burning his draft card in
protest of the Vietnam war. The Court held that the government
had a substantial interest in overseeing the smooth operation of the
military, especially in a time of war.5 8 Although David O'Brien
intended to convey a message by destroying the draft card, the
Court concluded that the government was concerned with his con-
duct and not with his message. 9 Ultimately, "when 'speech' and
'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms." 6°
In a more recent application of the substantial governmental in-
terest prong, the Supreme Court found that the State of Minnesota
had a substantial interest in maintaining control of the crowds at-
tending its state fair.6 1 This interest supported a regulation that
prohibited distribution of any merchandise, including printed pam-
and peaceful picketing); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
(Government regulations cannot be based on the content of First Amendment expres-
sion) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971)
(reversing conviction for wearing jacket bearing words "Fuck the Draft" as violative
of protected expression))); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969) (holding it
unconstitutional to convict one for speaking in defamatory terms about the American
flag).
52. See Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). The Court held that an ordinance prohibiting
picketing within 150 feet of a school, unless such picketing concerned a labor dispute,
impermissibly restricted speech based on its content.
53. See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
56. 391 U.S. 367, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968).
57. Id at 382.
58. Id. at 378-82.
59. See id. at 376.
60. Id. at 376.
61. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981).
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phlets, except from licensed areas within the state fairgrounds. 62
The Court noted that the existence of a substantial interest de-
pends upon the factual situation of each case.63
Where, however, a government regulation affects more than that
which the government has a substantial interest in proscribing, the
second "narrowly tailored" prong will not be satisfied. 64 For exam-
ple, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,5 the Supreme Court
struck down a municipal ordinance prohibiting the display of
nudity in outdoor movie theaters visible to non-movie-goers from a
public place.66 In finding the ordinance unconstitutional, the Court
held that non-objectionable nudity, which the government does not
have a substantial interest in proscribing, would also be regulated
under the ordinance.67 Therefore, the Jacksonville ordinance was
not sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster.
The final prong of the content-neutral time, place, and manner
test requires that a municipality leave open alternative channels of
communication for the dissemination of the protected speech being
regulated.68 The First Amendment not only insures freedom of ex-
pression but also mandates that the government safeguard public
access to protected expression. Protection of such access extends
both to the right of the speaker to'speak and of the listener to have
access to the protected speech or expression.69
3. Using the Content-Neutral Time, Place, and Manner Test to
Zone Restrictively the Dissemination of Pornographic
Material
The Supreme Court has held that regulations aimed at adult en-
tertainment alone satisfy the content-neutral requirement of valid
time, place, and manner regulations if they are aimed at the ad-
verse secondary effects of such businesses. The Court first ad-
dressed this issue in 1976, in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
62. Id at 650-51.
63. Id.
64. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
65. Id
66. Id. at 206-07.
67. Id The municipality's aim in enacting the ordinance was to keep "objectiona-
ble" films from the view of the general public, but it would also unconstitutionally
prohibit showing, for example, a baby's bottom.
68. See Heffron, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98; Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,442 (1957) (The First Amendment requires main-
tenance of public access to protected expression.).
69. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976).
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Inc.,70 and five years later in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim.7'
Both decisions examine whether a zoning ordinance restricting
adult establishments meets the content-neutral, time, place, and
manner test set forth in previous Supreme Court decisions.
Justice Stevens wrote for a plurality in Young. Joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist, the plurality up-
held the constitutionality of amendments to Detroit's "Anti-Skid
Row Ordinance. ' 72 Two movie theater operators challenged the
ordinance as unconstitutional 73 because it rcgulated theaters ac-
cording to the content of the films shown.74 Justice Stevens found
that the ordinance was justified by the city's interest in preserving
the quality of urban life - an interest unrelated to the suppression
of the content of the protected message conveyed by the films. 75
Justice Stevens found also that the city may regulate the location
of "adult motion picture theaters" through zoning, as long as the
total number of theaters in the city is not limited, and the market
for such theaters is "essentially unrestrained. '76
In contrast, five years after Young, in Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim,77 the Court struck down a local zoning ordinance
that banned all adult theatres, including all live entertainment and
nude dancing, from every commercial district in the city. Although
the Court recognized the local government's broad zoning power
for the purpose of maintaining a satisfactory quality of life, the
Court held that this power "must be exercised within constitutional
70. 427 U.S. 50, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976).
71. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
72. Young, 427 U.S. at 72-73. The primary purpose of the ordinance was to pre-
vent adult motion picture theaters from being concentrated in one area by requiring
minimal separation from residential areas, or between one theater and any two other
regulated adult businesses. Id. at 54 n.6.
73. Ik at 55.
74. lId at 52. Respondents argued that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague
as applied to non-adult theater owners who may not be able to determine how much
sexually explicit activity is required to subject a film to regulation. Justice Stevens
found that the ordinance was "readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state
courts," precluding respondents' assertion of rights of third parties. Id. at 60. In
addition, Justice Stevens found that the impact of the ordinance was plain to the re-
spondents, each of whom operated an adult theater, and was therefore not unconsti-
tutionally vague. Id. at 61.
75. Id. at 71. Justice Powell also concurred on this point as he found that the city
had "important and substantial" interests in regulating the adult theaters. Id. at 80
(Powell, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 62. In his concurrence, Justice Powell stressed that the record did not
indicate that the ordinance had effectively restricted production of, or access to, adult
movies. Id. at 77 (Powell, J., concurring).
77. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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limits."178 In finding the ordinance unconstitutional, the Court rea-
soned (i) that the municipality provided no conclusive evidence of
a substantial interest in prohibiting all forms of live entertain-
ment,79 and (ii) the municipality failed to prove that there were
adequate alternative channels of communication open to busi-
nesses subject to the regulation. 80  The Court stated that its deci-
sion in Young was not controlling because in Young "the restriction
did not affect the number of adult movie theaters that could oper-
ate in the city; it merely dispersed them."81
One commentator stated that the difference between Young and
Schad rests in their emphasis:
[W]here Young stressed that the objective of the regulation must
not be the suppression of protected expression and that access
to that expression must remain available, Schad emphasized that
regulation cannot be so broad as to completely prohibit pro-
tected expression and that the regulation must further a substan-
tial governmental interest.82
4. The Supreme Court's Latest Pronouncement Sets a Deferential
Standard: City'of Renton v. Playtime Theatres
In 1986, the Supreme Court made its latest proclamation on mu-
nicipalities' power to zone adult businesses.83 In City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres,84 the Court considered the validity of an ordi-
nance that prohibited the establishment of an adult motion picture
theater within 1000 feet of any residential zone, family dwelling,
church, park, or school.8 5 Citing Young, the Court held that the
Renton ordinance was a proper content-neutral time, place, and
manner zoning regulation, because it was "designed to serve a sub-
stantial governmental interest and d[id] not unreasonably limit al-
78. Id at 68 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment).
79. Id. at 72.
80. Id at 75-76.
81. Id at 71.
82. Brody, supra note 46, at 689.
83. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, reh'g denied, 475 U.S.
1132 (1986).
84. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
85. Id at 43. When respondent adult business owners challenged the ordinance as
unconstitutional, the district court ruled for the city, and denied the owners' request
for a permanent injunction against enforcement of the ordinance. Id The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that to adequately
substantiate its interest, the municipality must conduct original studies of the adult
theaters' adverse impact on the City of Renton, or provide evidence independent of
data obtained by other cities. Id. at 45-50.
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ternative avenues of communication." s Notably, the Court
deferred to the city's desire "to preserve the quality of urban
life," a stating that this objective satisfied the first "vital govern-
mental interest" prong of the constitutionality test."8 In fact, the
Court stated that as "long as whatever evidence the city relies upon
is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city
addresses," the evidence will be sufficient to support a finding of a
substantial governmental interest.8 9
The Court determined further that a municipality may choose
the method by which it furthers its substantial governmental inter-
ests.90 Such regulation will pass the second "narrowly tailored"
prong9' if it affects only that category of theaters that produces the
unwanted secondary effects. 92
Lastly, the ordinance upheld in Renton passed the third prong of
the constitutional test because it left open reasonable alternative
channels of communication.93 The Court found that the land left
available for relocation of the adult movie theaters was "[a]mple,
accessible real estate. ' 94 It stated further that "we have never sug-
gested that the First Amendment compels the Government to en-
sure that adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech-related
businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at bargain
prices."95
86. Id. at 47. For a discussion of recent developments of the standard of review
applied to the regulation of adult entertainment, see generally David J. Christiansen,
Zoning and the First Amendment Rights of Adult Entertainment, 22 VAL. U. L. REv.
695, 705-09 (1988). Christiansen argues that the time, place, and manner standard in
adult entertainment cases is not stringently applied. Id. at 712.
87. Id. at 50 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion)).
88. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
89. Id. at 51-52 Renton, a suburb of Seattle, relied heavily upon studies prepared
by Seattle when Renton wrote its ordinance to zone adult theaters. The Supreme
Court of Washington upheld Seattle's ordinance in Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle,
90 P.2d 709 (Wash. 1978), cert. denied, Apple Theatre v. City of Seattle, 441 U.S. 946
(1979). Id. at 50-51.
90. Id. at 52.
91. ld. (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) in defining
the narrowly tailored standard as "imposing no greater burden on adult entertain-
ment than is absolutely necessary to further the government's interest"). See supra
notes 77-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's holding in Schad
that a total ban on live entertainment was not the least intrusive means of regulating
adverse secondary effects of adult theaters and similiar entertainment.
92. 475 U.S. at 52.
93. Id. at 53-54.
94. Id. at 53 (quoting with approval from the record at the district court level).
95. Id. at 54. Petitioners argued that although the ordinance left "some 520 acres,
or more than five percent of the entire land area of Renton" for the location of adult
theaters, because some of the land was already occupied and "practically none" was
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Despite the Court's refusal to disturb the trial court's finding
that other land was available to establish an adult business,96 it may
in fact have created a "major competitive disadvantage" for propri-
etors of adult theaters trying to locate in an urban area.97 Argua-
bly, the wide latitude given to municipalities in fashioning a
restrictive zoning ordinance has resulted in the treatment of non-
obscene eroticism as a lesser form of prctected expression.98
The Renton decision does not delineate standards for enacting a
constitutional ordinance. Its progeny, however, gives some inter-
pretive guidance on the proper application of this constitutional
test. If one factor is clear in the time, place, and manner analysis, it
is that the constitutionality of each ordinance must be tested on a
case-by-case, fact-specific basis. For example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld an ordinance that
provided ninety-seven relocation sites for adult businesses.99  The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however,
struck down an ordinance that left 11,613.1 acres "definitively
available" for relocation of adult businesses in Los Angeles. 1°°
for sale or lease there were no "commercially viable" sites left for adult theaters
within the 520 acre designation. The Court of Appeals held the land was not truly
"available"; thus the ordinance would "result in a substantial restriction on speech."
Here the Supreme Court disagreed, stating: "Respondents must fend for themselves
in the real estate market," and need not be "on an equal footing with other prospec-
tive purchasers and lessees." Id. at 54.
96. See id. at 53 & n. 53. See also id. at 65 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ. dissenting)
(arguing that the ordinance does not put adult business on equal footing, but rather
bans a form of protected speech).
97. Gianni P. Servodidio, Comment, The Devaluation of Non-obscene Eroticism
as a Form of Expression Protected by the First Amendment, 67 Tui. L. Rnv. 1231,
1241 (1993).
98. Some commentators have suggested that the ultimate impact of Renton was to
remove adult films from the realm of public entertainment. By treating this result as
insignificant, or even beneficial, the Court seems to indicate that pornography is of
lesser value than other forms of Frst Amendment expression. See Servodidio, supra
note 97, at 1241. See also Brody, supra note 46 (analyzing cases where municipalities
have been given wide latitude to fashion ordinances restricting protected speech).
99. Ambassador Books & Video, Inc. v. City of Little Rock, 20 F.3d 858, 864 (8th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 186 (1994).
100. Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1537 (1994). For a discussion of the Topanga decision see infra
notes 166-170 and accompanying text.
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5. A More Restrictive Approach: New York's Highest Court Sets
a Different Standard
Despite the deferential standard in the Renton decision, 1°1 the
New York State Constitution, as interpreted by the highest court of
New York in Arcara v. Cloud Books'02 and Town of Islip v. Cavig-
la,0 3 affords greater protection to First Amendment expression
than the United States Constitution does. In Arcara v. Cloud
Books, Inc.,a°4 the New York State Court of Appeals, on remand
from the United States Supreme Court, found that "when a gov-
ernmental regulation designed to carry out a legitimate and impor-
tant State objective would incidentally burden free expression, the
government's action cannot be sustained unless the State can prove
that it is no broader than needed to achieve its purpose.'10 5
In Arcara, owners of a bookstore selling pornographic material
challenged a public health law provision that permitted the district
attorney to enjoin conduct that constituted a nuisance.0 6 The
bookstore was forced to close under the law because of sexual ac-
tivity allegedly occurring on the premises.10 7 The district attorney
argued that the bookstore was closed on account of conduct occur-
ring on the premises and not the content of the material sold.'
The Court of Appeals struck down the provision, finding that
permanent closure of the store was broader than necessary to
abate the nuisance, and achieve the governmental purpose.'09 The
Court reasoned that if the government had unsuccessfully used
other sanctions, such as arresting offenders or obtaining injunctive
relief, ultimately closing the bookstore would be justified."10
In Islip, the Court of Appeals found that the town of Islip, in
enacting a zoning ordinance restricting the location of adult
101. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
Renton decision.
102. 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986).
103. 540 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. i989). This decision follows New York's long-estab-
lished tradition of tolerating works that other states would find offensive. Id. at 221.
104. 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986).
105. Id. at 495 (citing Matter of Nicholson v. State Comm'n. on Judicial Conduct,
409 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1980); People v. Taub, 337 N.E.2d 754 (N.Y. 1975) (emphasis
added).
106. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 1089 (N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S.
697 (1986).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1097.
109. Id. at 1099.
110. Id. at 1098.
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businesses,11' did not violate the federal consititution, or the more
liberal New York State Constitution. The New York State Consti-
tution provides in pertinent part that:
Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and
no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or of the press.' 2
The court reasoned that the New York State Constitution, like
the federal constitution, requires that if zoning rules are an inten-
tional restriction on speech, they are subject to strict scrutiny re-
view."13 Specifically, "the governmental interest to be achieved
[must] outweigh the resulting interference with free expression; ' 14
however, under the New York State Constitution the means of reg-
ulation must be "no broader than needed to achieve its
purpose. '11 5
First, the court found that the regulations at issue were not a
purposeful attempt to regulate speech, but were enacted to correct
the negative effects adult businesses had on the surrounding com-
munity. 1 6 Moreover, the zoning regulations were no broader than
necessary to achieve Islip's purpose of curtailing the negative ef-
fects, because the regulations left available ample space for the
adult businesses to relocate, would not decrease the total number
of adult businesses, and did not hinder public access to the adult
businesses." 7
111. The court stated that "New York may interpret its own Constitution to extend
greater protection to its residents." Islip, 540 N.E.2d at 221. New York has used this
right to extend greater protection to First Amendment expression demonstrated
through "New York['s] ... long history and tradition of fostering freedom of expres-
sion, often tolerating and supporting works which in other States would be found
offensive to the community." ld. (citing Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 494).
112. Iat at 221 n.5 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8).
113. Id. at 221.
114. Id. at 221.
115. Islip, 540 N.E.2d at 223 (quoting Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 495).
116. Id. at 222. The court cited to Islip's study that documented the negative effects
of adult businesses. Id. at 222 n.6.
117. Id. at 223. In finding that the regulations were no broader than necessary, the
court compared the Islip ordinance to the means used in Arcara, and reasoned that
"the zoning regulations are less restrictive than banning adult uses altogether, and
more compatible with free speech values than a licensing scheme which arguably
could present opportunities for the improper exercise of discretion." Id.
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II. Does the City's Adult Zoning Resolution Reach Too
Broadly?
If the City's Adult Zoning Resolution is to survive legal chal-
lenges, it must meet the federal constitutional prerequisites set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Renton, and the New
York constitutional requirements as interpreted by the New York
State Court of Appeals.
A. The Substantial Governmental Interest Prong: Is there
sufficient evidence of adverse secondary effects?
The Supreme Court permits a municipality to rely on the studies
and conclusions of harmful secondary effects in other cities, as long
as the studies are "reasonably believed to be relevant to the prob-
lem that the city addresses."" 8 The New York State Court of Ap-
peals, however, has implied that a regulating municipality must
produce an independent study indicating that adult businesses
cause harmful secondary effects in that locality to prove that it has
a significant governmental interest in enacting the regulation. 119
The City's Adult Zoning Resolution satisfies the more stringent
New York State standard because it is based upon the City's own
DCP Study. 120 The DCP Study includes an exploration of studies
118. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986). A city
need not produce its own studies or introduce evidence to satisfy the constitutional
mandate.
119. In Islip, the court indicated that it is very important that a municipality con-
duct its own study - thus one may infer that Islip's case would have been much
weaker had it not conducted an independant study of the adverse secondary effects
adult businesses had on the community of Islip. Islip, 540 N.E.2d at 219-20. For exam-
ple, the court emphasized that Islip's study was more comprehensive than the study in
Renton, and the court stated in discussing the underinclusiveness of Renton's ordi-
nance that Renton did not prove it was regulating the adverse secondary effects
caused by adult businesses because "[ilt conducted no independent studies to identify
the harmful secondary effects of each business and establish their existence, as peti-
tioner [in Islip] did, but relied solely on the experience of other cities." Id. at 220. The
court also discussed petitioner's study as proof of a substantial governmental interest
in regulating negative effects of adult businesses, not the content of the materials sold.
Id. at 222 n.6.
120. The DCP Study provides proof of harmful secondary effects in New York City.
See generally DCP Study, supra note 1. Ordinances found unconstitutional for failure
to document a substantial governmental interest in curtailing adverse secondary ef-
fects generally did not include any relevant evidence proving the existence of the
interest. See, e.g., Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernadino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988); Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d
489, 493 (6th Cir. 1987); City of Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242, 247-48 (Or. 1988).
The New York City Bar's Testimony concluded that the DCP Study did not suffi-
ciently prove that adult entertainment causes adverse secondary effects in New York
City. New York City Bar's Testimony, supra note 11, at 12. The Bar's position is too
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and regulations of other localities, an in-depth analysis of the adult
entertainment industry across the nation and in New York City,
and a description of the secondary impacts caused by these busi-
nesses within New York City.12'
The DCP Study indicates that the most severe secondary effects
of adult businesses occur where adult businesses cluster together,
creating a "combat zone" effect.122 For example, the concentration
of adult businesses contributes to the high rate of criminal arrests
and prostitution in the Times Square Business District. 23 In the
Chelsea section of Manhattan, a local business survey revealed
negative impacts from adult businesses included declining commu-
nity reputation, worsening economic vitality of individual busi-
nesses and decreasing potential for business development. 124 This
Chelsea survey also showed that businesses will or have already
left on account of the presence of adult video stores. 125
A public meeting of The Task Force on the Regulation of Adult
Businesses in October 1993 discussed adult uses in Manhattan, in-
cluding Tribeca, Downtown Manhattan, Chelsea, East Harlem,
harsh. In undermining the DCP Study's conclusion that adult businesses cause ad-
verse secondary effects, the Bar dissects and scrutinizes sections of the DCP Study,
rather than looking at the DCP Study as a whole. Never has the United States Con-
stitution, or the New York State Constitution, been interpreted to require a city to
produce a study demonstrating a one-hundred percent correlation between adult
businesses and negative secondary effects or lose its presumptively constitutional
power to zone. When taken as a whole, the DCP Study sufficiently shows that adult
businesses, particularly when clustered together, contribute to an overall decline in
the quality of a neighborhood. Consequently, for constitutional purposes, the City
adequately proved that it has a substantial interest in regulating adult businesses. See
supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the deferential standard
under the United States Constitution to prove a substantial governmental interest,
and supra notes 116 and 119 and accompanying text for a discussion of the stricter
requirements under the New York State Constitution.
121. The DCP Study also cited studies from other municipalities including those
from Islip, New York; Los Angeles, California; Indianapolis, Indiana; Austin, Texas;
and Phoenix, Arizona. DCP Study, supra note 1, at 3-15.
122. DCP Study, supra note 1, at viii. The DCP Study indicated further that the
people residing near an adult business fear the emergence of a combat zone in their
neighborhood. Id
123. Id at 40-41 Almost twice as many complaints of criminal activity and higher
prostitution arrests were reported in blocks studied by the Times Square Business
Improvement District, as compared to marked decreases in crime where adult uses
had moved out.
124. Id. at 37.
125. Id at 37-38. In the seventy-six block area of Chelsea, authorities have closed
triple-X stores for "multiple indoor prostitution arrests" and illegal sex-related activi-
ties. Id. at 37.
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Times Square and the East Side.12 6 The transcript cited crime most
frequently, including drugs and prostitution, as a negative effect of
adult businesses. 127 Littering, noise, late night operations, and of-
fensive signage also contributed to neighborhood decline and were
problematic for families with children. 28
Just as problematic as increased crime rates is the value deterio-
ration of property located in close proximity to an adult business.
The Times Square Business Improvement District conducted a
study that revealed that property in blocks with adult businesses
arguably do not increase in value at a rate commensurate with
those blocks not containing adult uses.' 29 The DCP Study indi-
cated that real estate brokers support the contention that adult
businesses have a negative impact on the market value of neigh-
boring properties. 130 Moreover, real estate appraisers and urban
planners suggest that a single adult establishment causes negative
perceptions of a neighborhood, and those negative perceptions can
lead to disinvestment and overall economic decline.' 3' This nega-
tive impact, coupled with fear of proliferation and the exposure of
lewd, sexual images to children, indicates that even a single adult
business affects the quality of life in a neighborhood.
Finally, the DCP Study concluded that signage for adult estab-
lishments is at odds with that of other businesses. Not only do
many adult businesses display graphic material, but their signs oc-
cupy a greater portion of the storefronts and are substantially more
illuminated than signs of other businesses.132 Consequently, New
York City has adequately established that it has a substantial inter-
est in regulating adult businesses.
126. DCP Study, supra note 1, at 38-39. The Task Force was established in 1993 by
Ruth W. Messinger, Manhattan Borough President, in response to community con-
cerns about increasing conconcentrations of sex-related businesses. Id at 38.
127. Id
128. Id
129. Id at 40-41 (citing Insight Associates, Secondary Effects of the Concentration
of Adult Use Establishments in the Times Square Area (1994)). The Times Square
Business Improvement District contracted for this study to be done on the Tunes
Square area.
130. DCP Study, supra note 1, at viii. Eighty percent of real estate brokers who
responded to the DCP Study indicate negative impact on surrounding property
values.
131. Id
132. DCP Study, supra note 1, at 48.
206
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B. The Narrowly Tailored Requirement: Will, the City's Adult
Zoning Resolution reach too broadly into the realm of
protected speech?
The second prong of the federal Renton test requires that a zon-
ing regulation be narrowly tailored to prohibit only those catego-
ries of protected speech known to produce the unwanted
secondary effects. 133 This requirement is necessary to prevent the
flaw fatal to the regulation in Schad, where the ordinance regulated
speech that did not cause adverse secondary effects.134
The New York State Court of Appeals has interpreted the New
York State Constitution to require that a restrictive zoning ordi-
nance be no broader than necessary to achieve the government's
objective. 135
Moreover, the New York State Constitution requires more than
a mere rational relationship between the exercise of police powers
and the suppression of First Amendment expression. 36 In Bel-
lanca v. New York State Liquor Authority,37 on remand from the
United States Supreme Court, the New York State Court of Ap-
peals required that a municipality have more than a mere rational
basis' 3 for regulating topless dancing through its power to regu-
late the sale and consumption of alcohol. 39 Although the Supreme
Court decided that the municipality's action was justified under the
Twenty-First Amendment to the federal constitution, 14° the New
York court found, as it did in Islip, that the New York State Consti-
133. Renton, 475 U.S. at 52.
134. l&
135. Islip, 540 N.E.2d at 223 (citing Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492
(N.Y. 1985) as the source for the "applicable State Standard for reviewing such [a
zoning] regulation .... "). The court in Islip also analyzed the zoning ordinance under
the federal narrowly tailored prong. Id at 220. In upholding the ordinance as suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored, the court cited to Arcara and the discussion of the requir-
ment that an ordinance be no broader than needed to achieve the governmental
purpose. lI
136. Bellanca, 429 N.E.2d 765, 769 (N.Y. 1981).
137. 429 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1981).
138. The regulating municipality must have a substantial interest in regulating top-
less dancing. Id. at 769.
139. The court decided that freedom of expression under the New York State Con-
stitution is not curtailed by the Twenty-First Amendment power to regulate the sale of
alcohol, but may be curtailed under the police power of the state. Id at 766.
140. U.S. CONST. amend, xxxi. The Twenty-First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in pertinent part:
SETON 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
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tution requires more.141 Topless dancing 142 is protected expression
under Section 8 of Article I of the New York State Constitution;143
thus, municipalities cannot regulate topless dancing through the
power to regulate the sale and consumption of alcohol unless there
are:
circumstances so functionally related to the exercise of the
State's authority to regulate the sale and consumption of alco-
holic beverages as to overcome the applicable constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression, as for instance, by a rule...
prohibiting topless dancing performed on a stage or platform
less than 18 inches above the immediate floor level or removed
by less than six feet from the nearest patron. 44
Although in the Bellanca decision the court did not lay out the
exact standard for the constitutional exercise of police powers, sub-
sequently, in Islip, the court indicated that the New York State
Constitution requires that the City prove it has a substantial gov-
ernmental interest in regulating protected expression. 45
Topless bars make up the majority of adult establishments
outside Manhattan, and in Manhattan are most lucrative in tourist
areas;146 yet, the DCP Study fails to prove that topless bars cause
unwanted secondary effects. In fact, the DCP Study attributes the
recent success of these clubs to the fact that they:
SECrION 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been rati-
fied as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several
States ....
141. Bellanca, 429 N.E.2d at 768-69. In Islip, the New York State Court of Appeals
found that Islip's study document that the regulated adult businesses have harmful
effects in that community. Islip, 540 N.E.2d at 222 n.6.
142. Two later New York decisions in the Appellate Division, Second Department,
recognized the power of a municipality to regulate "adult" performances under a Li-
quor Authority Rule prohibiting lewd and indecent conduct in premises selling alco-
hol. Both performances were deemed lewd, and both were subject to regulation.
Both decisions also stated that topless dancing is not inherently obscene. These deci-
sions imply that topless and nude dancing is protected expression that can only be
regulated by the Liquor Authority or through other police powers if the performance
is deemed obscene. See Blau-Par Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 482
N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that regulation of obscene behavior
does not violate the state constitution); Highway Tavern Corp. v. McLaughlin, 483
N.Y.S.2d 323 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
143. See supra note 112 and accompanying text for text of article I, § 8.
144. Bellanca,429 N.E.2d at 766 (citation omitted).
145. Islip, 540 N.E.2d at 221.
146. David Firestone, In Land of Topless Bars, a Ho-Hum, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1994, at 41 (stating that thirty out of forty-four adult establishments in Queens are
topless bars, and seventeen out of twenty-six in the Bronx, Brooklyn and Staten Is-
land are topless bars); DCP Study, supra note 1, at 26.
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shed their "sleazy" reputations and bec[ame] more mainstream
by providing topless entertainment in safe, elegant surroundings
furnished with other attractions such as giant closed circuit tele-
vision screens, pool tables and air hockey. 147
Because the City has failed to produce evidence that topless en-
tertainment causes adverse secondary effects, under the federal
constitution the City's Adult Zoning Resolution is not sufficiently
narrowly tailored. Moreover, under the New York State Constitu-
tion, it is broader than needed to achieve the City's purpose of reg-
ulating adverse secondary effects.
C. Reasonably Available Alternative Avenues of
Communication
The third prong of the time, place, and manner test requires that
a regulating municipality leave open a reasonable number of alter-
native relocation sites for the displaced businesses."1 The federal
courts and the highest New York State court 149 agree that in order
to pass constitutional scrutiny, a restrictive zoning ordinance
should not reduce the total number of adult businesses. 50
1. Federal Constitutional Requirements
In Young,'5 ' Justice Steven's plurality opinion and Justice Pow-
ell's concurrence concluded that the challenged Detroit zoning or-
dinance was constitutional because it did not reduce the public's
access to adult establishments, nor did it "affect the operation of
existing establishments but only the location of new ones."'51 2 Sub-
sequently, in Schad,'5 3 a majority of the Court struck down a regu-
147. DCP Study, supra note 1 at 18-19 (recognizing the upscale clientele and high
profitability of these establishments) (emphasis added).
148. See supra notes 68-69, 93-100 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion
of the third prong of the time, place, and manner test.
149. In both Islip and Arcara, the New York State Court of Appeals required that
the municipality enact regulations (that curtail First Amendment expression) that are
no broader than needed to achieve its governmental objective. See supra notes 111-17
and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the Islip decision, and see supra
notes 104-10 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the Arcara decision.
150. See, e.g., Schad, 452 U.S. at 71; Young, 427 U.S. at 62, n. 35; Islip, 540 N.E.2d at
223.
151. 427 U.S. 50 (1976)
152. Id at 71 n.35 (quoting Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F.Supp. 363, 370
(E.D. Mich. 1974)). Justice Powell also reasoned that the Detroit ordinance passed
the third prong because the ordinance did not cause a "significant overall curtailment
of adult movie presentations, or the opportunity for a message to reach an audience."
Id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring).
153. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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lation that prohibited nude dancing, and distinguished the
regulation from the Detroit ordinance because the Detroit ordi-
nance "did not affect the number of adult movie theatres that could
operate in the city ....
Several circuit court decisions also stress that an ordinance must
not reduce the total number of adult businesses. 15 For example, in
Christy v. City of Ann Arbor,156 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit was concerned that an ordinance would
severely limit the total number of adult businesses in the commu-
nity.'1 7 The court reasoned that an ordinance need not wipe out all
adult establishments, but may merely be overly restrictive (thus de-
creasing the overall number of adult businesses), to be struck down
as unconstitutional under the strict analysis in Schad.158
Circuit courts have also warned that a separation provision'5 9 in-
creases the likelihood that a zoning ordinance will decrease the to-
tal number of adult businesses. For example, in Walnut Properties,
Inc. v. City of Whittier, 60 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit distinguished Whittier's ordinance from the ordinance the
Supreme Court examined in Renton, because Whittier's ordinance
separated adult businesses by 1,000 feet from other adult busi-
nesses, churches, schools and parks.' 61 Although 99.5 acres of land
were deemed available to adult businesses, the court held that the
154. Id. at 71. In Renton, the Court's latest pronouncement on the regulation of
adult businesses, one can infer that the Court did not address whether the ordinance
at issue would reduce the number of adult businesses in the city because only one
such business existed in Renton, and 560 acres were available for relocation. Renton,
475 U.S. at 44.
155. See, e.g., Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988); Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102,
1108-09 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989).
156. 824 F.2d at 489.
157. I& at 492. The court relied on earlier Sixth Circuit zoning decisions that con-
sidered the factual basis of each municipality in determining the regulation's constitu-
tionality. Id. Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir.
1981) (striking down ordinance that effectively banned all adult theatres). See also
CLR Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that permitting only
two to four restricted businesses in a half-mile strip of a twenty-five square mile city
constitutes a severe restriction on First Amendment expression).
158. Christy, 824 F.2d at 492 (citing CLR Corp., 702 F.2d at 639). The court vacated
the district court's order denying petitioners a preliminary injunction and remanded,
finding that .23 percent of land made available for relocation may not satisfy the alter-
native relocation requirement.
159. See supra note 27 for details of the separation provision in the City's Adult
Zoning Resolution.
160. 861 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
161. ld. at 1109. See also CLR Corp., 702 F.2d at 638-39 (In a pre-Renton decision
the court found that an ordinance with a separation provision permitting two to four
210
1995] RESTRICTIVE ZONING OF ADULT BUSINESSES 211
separation provision would actually leave only a fraction of the
acreage potentially available to adult businesses, 162 and would
force the plaintiff's adult theatre to close.163
Notably, Los Angeles is the only municipality with close to the
number of adult establishments that operate in New York City that
attempted to restrictively zone their location and was challenged
on First Amendment grounds.' 61 In Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles,165 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit enjoined Los Angeles's ordinance because it failed to leave
an adequate number of relocation sites for the adult businesses
that it ultimately forced to close.' 66 The court assessed "whether a
particular relocation site is in fact part of the real estate market,' 67
and whether those sites determined to be in the market are suffi-
cient to support the displaced businesses.168 The court reasoned
that the separation provision, the low percentage of commercially
restricted adult businesses in a half-mile of the city impermissibly restricted First
Amendment expression.).
162. Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1109. The court reasoned that the separation
requirement made the ordinance "vastly different" from the ordinance in Renton,
where only market forces determined the availability of land. Id.
163. Id. This reasoning implies that a separation requirement in Renton's ordi-
nance may have led the Supreme Court to a different conclusion.
164. See Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1532 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1537 (1994). There were 102 adult businesses in Los
Angeles at the time of the decision. Id. at 1532.
165. Id
166. Id at 1533. Pursuant to the City Department of Planning study, Los Angeles
enacted a municipal code prohibiting adult businesses from being located, enlarged,
or subject to transfer of ownership within 500 feet of churches, schools, parks, or
within 1,000 feet of other adult businesses. The code was amended four times; the
third amendment added the 500 foot separation requirement from residential zones.
Id. at 1527.
167. Topanga, 989 F.2d at 1530. The court recognized that Renton did not state
what sort of factors may be considered when deciding whether relocation sites pro-
vided by a city are reasonable. The court acknowledged further that "Renton as-
sumed that the relocation sites were already part of the market." Id. at 1529. The
court in Woodall v. City of El Paso, 959 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1992), adopted the Ninth
Circuit's analysis of Renton in stating that "the Court [in Renton] obviously contem-
plated that there was a 'market' in which businesses could purchase or lease real
property on which business could be conducted." 959 F.2d at 1306.
168. Topanga, 989 F.2d at 1531. Loss of profits, cost of overhead or the feasibility of
the site for adult businesses should not be considered in determining whether a site is
part of the real estate market, but rather whether the site is part of a real estate
market for commercial enterprises in general. Id. A geographical expert testified that
although there were 11,613.10 acres of land "available" under the ordinance, much of
the land was not truly available after he assessed physical and practical factors such as
inaccessibility or unsuitability due to, among other things, a harbor, a landfill, a por-
tion of a hospital, property leased for a term of years, inaccessibility and lack of an
infrastructure. Id. at 1532.
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zoned land, and the lack of accessibility to manufacturing zones
contribute to a reduction in the number of relocation sites within
the relevant real estate market, making the Los Angeles regulation
unconstitutional. 169
2. New York State Precedent
The New York State Court of Appeals interprets the New York
State Constitution to require that a municipality's regulation be
"no broader than needed" to regulate protected expression. 70
Specifically, in upholding an ordinance that zoned restrictively
adult businesses, the court in Islip emphasized that no evidence in-
dicated that the ordinance would cause the total number of adult
businesses to decline, nor would the ordinance curtail access to the
protected expression. 71 The Islip ordinance restricted adult busi-
nesses to 6,000 acres zoned as Industrial I, and required separation
of one half mile between each regulated use.172 The court stressed
that had the facts shown that by enforcing the ordinance "the total
number of adult bookstores will decline or that fewer potential cus-
tomers will be able to conveniently patronize them," the ordinance
would not have met the strict requirements of the New York State
Constitution. 3
3. The City's Adult Zoning Resolution
The City's Adult Zoning Resolution is unconstitutional because
it will reduce the total number of adult businesses in New York
City, 74 as well as reduce access to those businesses. 75 Although
169. The expert determined that although there were 120 relocation sites in the
relevant real estate market, the separation of one adult business from another would
reduce this number even further. Id. at 1533.
170. Islip, 540 N.E.2d at 223.
171. Id. at 223. The court upheld the ordinance under both the federal and state
constitutions, citing to both Renton and Young. Id. at 218-19, 221.
172. Id. at 220.
173. Id. at 223.
174. See id. The City was reportedly estimating that before the most recent amend-
ment, the then-proposed zoning regulations would reduce the number of adult busi-
nesses to fifteen. Robin Pobgrebin, Neighborhood ReporL" Manhattan Up Close; Sex
Zone Rules: A Roundup, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1995, § 6 at 6. See also Robin Pob-
grebin, Mayor Finds Obstacles In Regulating Sex Shops, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1995, § 1
at 29 ( "[N]ew zoning... would limit sex businesses to manufacturing and commercial
areas and is expected to reduce the number of such establishments initially to 15 city-
wide, from 177"); Vivian S. Toy, Council Approves Package Of Curbs On Sex Busi-
nesses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1995, atAl ("[If they withstand the court challenge that
opponents have promised, the new rules will sharply reduce the number and location
of sex shops and theaters in parts of the city. . . ."); John Tierney, The Big City;
*XXXposition Center, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 22, 1995, § 6, at 36 (referring to
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the Planning Commission amended the City's Adult Zoning Reso-
lution 176 to increase the land area in Manhattan that is available for
adult businesses by forty percent, 77 this figure did not cure the in-
firmity. Despite the amendment, few commercial districts in Man-
hattan and in the outer boroughs are available to adult businesses,
thus banishing the existing adult establishments primarily to manu-
facturing districts in the outer boroughs. 78 Consequently, the total
number of adult businesses in New York City will be unconstitu-
tionally reduced. 79
reduction. of adult businesses in a satirical piece). The New York City Bar's Testi-
mony stated that the then-proposed regulations would permit only twenty-eight of
the 177 adult businesses identified by the DCP Study to continue operating in their
present location - an eighty-four percent decrease in the number of adult businesses
in New York City. New York City Bar Testimony, supra note 11 at 14. The Testimony
concluded that the decrease is constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 16.
175. See Islip, 540 N.E.2d at 220.
176. The Planning Commission amended the then-proposed City's Adult Zoning
Resolution only days before it passed the Resolution. Jonathan P. Hicks, Sex Shops
Zoning Plan Eases Rules in Manhattan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at B1; Jonathan P.
Hicks, Planning Commission Approves Limits on Sex Businesses By Slim Margin,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at B3. Prior to the amendment, protesters were highly
vocal, expressing fears that the zoning regulations would force adult businesses into
poorer neighborhoods in the outer boroughs. See Jonathan P. Hicks, Plan to Change
Sex Zoning Rules Draws Vocal Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1995, at BI; Paul
Moses and Curt Simmons, Not Everyone Likes Proposal on Sex Shops, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 13, 1994, at A23. One Greenpoint resident who owns a business and moved to
the area, because she was attracted to the "urban mix of people, light manufacturing
and businesses," said she "fears adult uses on the fringes of Greenpoint would draw
customers from other neighborhoods, who would be followed by "predatory crack
hookers and muggers." Robert Lipsyte, Porn, Part 2: Maybe Mild Side Isn't So Mild,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, § 13 at 1. Residents fear that adult uses will be permitted in
Sunset Park and along the Gowanus Canal, which "is one of the few places outside of
East New York where you have solid manufacturing zoning." Merle English, Neigh-
bors Plan to Fight Sex Shops; Park Slope Residents Say Proposal Will Attract Pornog-
raphy to Area, NEWSDAY, BROOKLYN ErrIoN, Nov. 21, 1994, at B07.
177. Hicks, Planning Commission Approves Limits on Sex Businesses by Slim Mar-
gin, supra note 176; Hicks, Sex Shops Zoning Plan Eases Rules in Manhattan, supra
note 176.
178. Originally, adult businesses would be banned to areas zoned Manufacturing I
and II. Telephone Interview with Kevin Davitt, Director of Public Information for
the Department of City Planning, (Feb. 1995) (Mr. Davitt no longer holds this
postition).
179. The most recent amendment to the City's Adult Zoning Resolution increased
the commercial land area available to adult businesses by removing a 500 foot buffer
zone between "areas where adult establishments are allowed and the high density
commercial areas where they would be prohibited." Hicks, Planning Commission
Approves Limits on Sex Businesses By Slim Margin,.supra note 176. This added relo-
cation space in areas such as the Diamond District, Times Square, and Herald Square.
Id. Importantly, it is impossible to estimate how many adult businesses a specific area
Will accommodate until a business actually locates in that area because of the separa-
tion provision. Telephone Interview with Kevin Davitt, (March 22, 1995). For exam-
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An earlier amendment to the City's Adult Zoning Resolution
concerning commercial districts designated C6-4 illustrates further
how the separation provision can limit significantly the number of
adult businesses that can locate in a given area.180 Although the
C6-4 districts compose approximately five percent of the City's
land mass, they could accomodate only twelve to fifteen businesses
because of the separation provision."8 '
IH. Developing Means to a Constitutional End: A Few
Changes May Rid the City's Adult Zoning Resolution
of Constitutional Infirmity
The City's Adult Zoning Resolution must undergo some essen-
tial, although not drastic, alterations to withstand constitutional
scrutiny. With these changes, the City will meet its objective of
curtailing the adverse secondary effects of adult businesses, while
complying with constitutional mandates. The adjustments that may
correct the constitutional infirmities of the City's Adult Zoning
Resolution are: removal of topless dancing as a regulated business;
inclusion of more commercial districts; and tougher signage
regulation.
A. The City's Adult Zoning Resolution Should Not Include
Topless Dancing as a Regulated Business in Absence of
Proof of Adverse Secondary Effects
The City's Adult Zoning Resolution is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored and is broader than necessary to achieve the City's objec-
tive, because it regulates the location of adult establishments that
provide topless dancing - a type of adult business that the City
has not shown causes adverse secondary effects.18 The City should
remove topless dancing from the list of regulated business so that
pie, in Times Square - between Ninth and Sixth Avenues and West 54th and West
40th Streets, there are at least twelve established churches and synagogues. Encyclo-
pedia of New York City 1185 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1995).
180. Hicks, Sex Shops Zoning Plan Eases Rules in Manhattan, supra note 176.
181. Telephone Interview with Kevin Davitt, supra note 179 (Mr. Davitt stated that
although he made this theoretical estimate, until a business moves into a C6-4 block-
front, it is practically impossible to determine how may businesses the blockfront will
accomodate). Several circuit court decisions indicate that despite the amount of acre-
age alloted to adult businesses, there still may not be a sufficient number of relocation
sites available. See, e.g., Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524
(9th Cir. 1993).
182. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the
DCP Study and which adult businesses for which it has documented proof of negative
secondary effects. Without proof of secondary effects, the City has not proven it has
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the City's Adult Zoning Resolution regulates only those adult busi-
nesses that cause adverse secondary effects.
B. The City's Adult Zoning Resolution Should Not Exclude
Commercial Districts
The City's Adult Zoning Resolution will reduce the number of
adult establishments and therefore not meet the New York State
and federal constitutional mandates. 8 3 Banning adult establish-
ments from the majority of commercial districts contributes signifi-
cantly to the reduction because the adult businesses are shut out of
districts considered appropriate for the location of commercial en-
terprises. 184 Therefore, the City should add more dense commer-
cial districts 85 to its Resolution in order to provide adult
a substantial governmental interest in regulating the protected First Amendment
expression.
183. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text for detailed discussion of how
the City's Adult Zoning Resolution will reduce the total number of adult businesses.
184. Even First Amendment advocates concede that pornography is inappropriate
in residential communities, while they assert that adult businesses must have access to
commercial locations. Should Pornography Be Legal? (CNN Television Broadcast,
Jan. 28, 1995) (Interview with Cathleen Cleaver, acting director of National Law
Center for Children and Nadine Strossen, President of the ACLU)). Ms. Strossen
stated that pornography has a place in public areas that are commercial where there
are many expressions people may find offensive, including sexually provocative ads
for underwear and jeans. Id. Circuit and state courts have noted that the availability
of commercial land is an important factor in determining whether there are a suffi-
cient number of relocation sites for adult businesses. See, e.g., Ambassador Book &
Video, Inc. v. City of Little Rock, 20 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
186 (1994) (upholding ordinance that did not exclude commercial areas, and left open
ninety-seven potential relocation sites prevented decrease in the number of adult
businesses); Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 928 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding
that 285 acres, or 10.2 percent of city's commercial land was sufficient for relocation
of adult businesses); Lakeland Lounge v. City of Jackson, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 973
F.2d 1255, 1260 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1845 (1993) (upholding restric-
tion of six adult businesses to light industrial use areas and part of the central business
district without a permit); S&G News, Inc. v. City of Southgate, 638 F.Supp. 1060,
1066 (1986), aff'd 819 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding it permissible to restrict adult
businesses to commercial districts comprising 2.3 percent of the city); City of National
City v. Weiner, 838 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 85 (1993) (upholding
ordinance that made available "the entire commercially zoned area of the city, or 572
acres of land" and only the opening of new businesses would be affected); 23 West
Washington St., Inc. v. City of Hagerstown, 972 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 1262 (finding it permissible to keep two existing adult uses out of only some
commercial districts).
185. Dense commercial districts for purposes of this Note are those commercial
districts that are zoned primarily for commercial use, and are primarily occupied by
commercial establishments. For example, this Note does not advocate adding C1 or
C5 Commercial Districts. C1 districts "accommodate the retail and personal service
shops needed in residential neighborhoods. These districts are often mapped as an
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businesses with substantially more commercially viable and publi-
cally accessible land.186
If a business community is opposed to an adult establishment
locating in a commercial district, there are self-regulatory channels
available to concerned residents to rid the area of the unwanted
business.'87 Property owners can collectively decide not to rent to
adult businesses - a good business decision because owners often
get lower rents for upper floors of a building with an adult business
on the ground floor.'88 For example, on Eighth Avenue from 35th
to 41st Streets, a group called the "Fashion Center Business Im-
overlay along major avenues in otherwise residentially zoned neighborhoods. They
are widely mapped throughout the City. T'ypical uses included grocery stores, small
dry cleaning establishments, restaurants and barber shops. All cater to the daily
needs of the immediate neighborhood." Department of City Planning, Zoning Hand-
book: A Guide to New York City's Zoning Resolution 76 (1990) [hereinafter Hand-
book]. "C5 is a restricted central commercial district intended primarily for retail
uses which serve the metropolitan region and for areas where continuous retail front-
age is desired... typically developed with department stores, large office buildings,
and mixed buildings with residential space above office or commercial floors." Id. at
84 (emphasis added).
186. The City should add dense commercial zones that are defined in the following
ways:
C4 - "major commercial centers located outside of the central business districts.
They allow department stores, theaters and other commercial uses that serve a larger
area." Handbook, supra note 185, at 82.
C6 - "C6 districts are zoned for a wide range of high bulk commercial uses requir-
ing a central location. Most C6 districts are in Manhattan and provide for corporate
headquarters, large hotels, entertainment facilities, retail stores, and some residential
development in mixed buildings." Id. at 86.
For example, adding commercial zone C4 will add approximately seventy-five dis-
tricts throughout the five boroughs. Zoning Resolution of the City of New York, City
Planning Commission and the Department of City Planning, (Map Volume) [hereinaf-
ter Zoning Resolution]. Further, C6 zones will greatly increase the available commer-
cial areas in Manhattan, id., and yet adult businesses that try to locate in these areas
will be subject to the separation provision. To put the impact of the separation provi-
sion in perspective, and thus illustrate the need for more commercial land in Manhat-
tan and the outer boroughs, there are approximately 2200 Protestant and Orthodox
Churches in New York City, and 351 Roman Catholic Churches. Encyclopedia of
New York City, supra note 179, at 222 (not including Jewish Temples, Arab Mosques,
and other types of houses of worship). There are also 1069 public high schools, id. at
960, and forty-seven colleges offering baccalaureate degrees (excluding colleges of the
City of New York, and those offering only two year degrees). Id. at 252-53. Thirty-
nine of those colleges are located in Manhattan. Id.
187. Lipsyte, supra note 176 (Gowanus, Brooklyn residents see that the solution to
the problem of excluding commercial areas is to leave the porn shops in commercial
areas and let people protest.); Neighborhood Report; Caffeine and Crackdowns: Dis-
patches from '94, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1995, § 13 at 5 (discussing 42nd Street redevelop-
ment process - kicking out porn shop owners with new business ventures).
188. See Douglas Martin, Where's 42nd St. Grit? Around the Corner; Slow Change
Along Eighth Ave. Strip, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1994, at B1.
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provement District" convinced more than eighty percent of the
landlords to sign an. agreement not to rent to adult establish-
ments.189 Residents also have the option to picket against the adult
business in order to drive it out of their neighborhood. 90 Ulti-
mately, signage regulations in the City's Adult Zoning Resolution
will prevent a single adult business from damaging the economic
viability of a commercial area.19'
C. The City's Adult Zoning Resolution's Provision That
Regulates Adult Businesses' Advertising Should Be
More Restrictive
Although advertising, or "commercial speech," is protected by
the First Amendment, like pornography it receives lesser protec-
tion. 92 The Supreme Court declared that regulations of commer-
cial speech are constitutional if the regulating body has a
substantial interest, the regulation directly advances that interest,
and it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 93 In 1984 the
Supreme Court granted more latitude to municipalities by includ-
ing the promotion of aesthetic values as a substantial governmental
interest sanctioning restriction of commercial speech. 194 In its most
recent decision on this issue, the Court stated that "governments
may regulate the characteristics of signs,- just as they can within
reasonable bounds and absent censorial purpose, regulate audible
expression in its capacity as noise."' 95
189. See id. See Ravo, supra note 10 (Pressure on landlords proved to be a success-
ful tactic for closing adult businesses in Chelsea and Murray Hill.).
190. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Neighborhood Report: Baychester; It's Father
Gorman Versus the Sex Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1994, § 13 at 7; Garry Pierre-
Pierre, Neighborhood Report: Sunset Park; Here Come New Neighbors, Rated X, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, § 13 at 12; Ravo, supra note 10, at 1.
191. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text for discussion of how adult
businesses' advertising can negatively affect consumers' perceptions of a commercial
district.
192. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557,
562-63 (1980) (commercial speech is protected from unwarranted governmental
regulations).
193. Id. (finding that commercial speech is protected from unwarranted govern-
mental regulations). See also Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpay-
ers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984).
194. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (upholding as content-neutral time, place,
and manner regulation an ordinance prohibiting signs from all public property).
195. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2041 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 78 (1989); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)). The
Court, after recognizing the constitutional police power to regulate signs, struck down
an ordinance because it selectively prohibited the display of signs on residential prop-
erty. See also Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993) ("[L]aws restricting
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Nevertheless, it remains essential for a municipality regulating
commercial speech to prove the existence of the offending secon-
dary effects. 196 The Court recently struck down a law regulating
magazine stands in order to control litter that the stands allegedly
caused because the law did not also regulate those stands selling
newspapers. 97 Although the Court acknowledged that it upheld
the ordinance in Renton that regulated adult theatres but not other
adult businesses, 98 it distinguished the City of Renton's ordinance
because Renton provided documentation of the adverse secondary
effects produced by the adult businesses, while Cincinnati did not
show that magazines created more adverse effects than did
newspapers. 199
Applying the above principles, the City's Adult Zoning Resolu-
tion constitutionally regulates signage of adult businesses °.2  How-
ever, the City should make the Resolution more restrictive in order
to reduce further the liklihood that one adult business will deter
patrons from commercial areas where an adult business is located.
For example, the City's Adult Zoning Resolution should (i) specifi-
cally prohibit adult businesses from advertising with graphic win-
dow displays, and (ii) reduce further the permitted surface area of
each sign.
Conclusion
The City's Adult Zoning Resolution restrictively zoning adult
entertainment establishments throughout New-York City is an es-
sential step toward curtailing the adverse secondary effects that
adult businesses bring into a community. However, the City's
Adult Zoning Resolution must be drawn carefully to regulate only
those businesses that cause the harmful secondary effects. Because
the extensive DCP Study does not show that topless establishments
contribute to negative secondary effects, topless dancing must be
removed from the list of regulated adult businesses.
Further, the City's Adult Zoning Resolution must not cause a
constitutionally impermissible decline in the overall number of
adult establishments. By expanding the number of permissible
commercial speech, unlike laws burdening other forms of protected expression, need
only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a substantial state interest in order to
survive First Amendment scrutiny.").
196. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1517 (1993).
197. Id. at 1516-17.
198. Id at 1516.
199. Id. at 1516-17.
200. See supra notes 29-31 for discussion of the provision regulating advertising.
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commercial districts in which adult businesses can locate, the lik-
lihood of a decline will be reduced, and public access to constitu-
tionally protected, non-obscene adult entertainment will be
ensured.

